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observation of autochthonous delusions, 
which remain firmly held despite contrary 
environmental evidence, and also the pres-
ence of generalized cognitive biases such as 
the bias against disconfirmatory evidence 
(Moritz and Woodward, 2006), suggesting 
a less transparent role of prediction error 
estimation in schizophrenia.
Can the findings of reduced susceptibil-
ity to perceptual illusions be viewed as con-
ferring a schizophrenia-related behavioral 
advantage? If so, is this outperformance of 
healthy individuals by those with schizophre-
nia best explained by a predictive failure? 
The findings of our own laboratory provide 
empirical evidence that predictive abnormal-
ities are not restricted to passive sensation 
– in accord with Clark’s suggestion of predic-
tion as a universal neural mechanism – but 
extend to predictions made on the basis of 
self-generated movement. Individuals with 
schizophrenia differ from healthy individuals 
in their ability to estimate the level of force 
necessary to match a force applied directly 
to themselves (Shergill et al., 2003, 2005). 
Healthy individuals over-estimate the level 
of necessary force in this context; imply-
ing that accurate prediction of the sensory 
consequences of an action (by means of a 
prediction error generated via an efference 
copy of that action being sent to the sensory 
system) results in sensory attenuation. The 
reduction of this effect in schizophrenia 
despite improved performance indexes rela-
tive failure of this system. A similar failure 
to adequately predict the sensory conse-
quences of inner speech (itself a category of 
self-action) has been influentially postulated 
to underlie auditory verbal hallucinations 
(Frith and Done, 1988), and receives grow-
ing neurophysiological support from tasks 
comparing the auditory processing of self-
generated words and the same sounds played 
back after recording (Ford et al., 2001; Ford 
and Mathalon, 2005; Simons et al., 2010).
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
Clark’s article provides a useful synthesis of 
theoretical and empirical work evincing the 
brain as a prediction machine and proposing 
bi-directional, prediction error estimation 
as a fundamental mechanism of adaptive 
brain function. Accordingly, in Bayesian 
terminology both cognitive and perceptual 
mental states can be understood as statistical 
posterior distributions formed by integrat-
ing encountered data (with specific likeli-
hoods) with prior beliefs (in turn with their 
own prior distributions). In his discussion 
of this unifying framework, Clark elegantly 
describes how updating priors with the aim 
of minimizing prediction error can some-
times result in illusory experience. When 
faced with stimuli manipulated to have 
multiple possible hidden causes, ambigu-
ity is resolved by selecting the most likely 
explanation given prior beliefs about those 
hidden causes. As such, in conditions such as 
those created for the sound-induced visual 
illusion (Shams et al., 2000), perception is 
Bayes optimal but illusory. Applying these 
principles to dysfunctional perception in 
psychiatric disorders, Clark also evaluates 
cognitive hypotheses of positive symptoms 
of schizophrenia, which account for hallu-
cination and delusion as manifestations of 
disturbances to the system responsible for 
the generation and weighting of prediction 
error.
Drawing together these parallel lines 
of enquiry, this commentary discusses 
the potential of studying prediction error 
during illusion-evoking situations in indi-
viduals with schizophrenia to improve our 
understanding of the physiological foun-
dations of the disorder. Schizophrenia is 
a devastating illness, characterized by the 
presence of hallucinations (perceptions in 
the absence of an external stimulus) and 
delusional beliefs (fixed false beliefs held 
contrary to evidence); with a marked impact 
on social and occupational functioning. The 
underlying mechanisms giving rise to these 
phenomena remain unclear, and current 
treatment is largely based on medication to 
block sub-cortical dopaminergic receptors, 
allied to cognitive behavioral psychologi-
cal approaches to reduce distress associ-
ated with these symptoms. Examination 
of individuals with schizophrenia demon-
strates that they are less susceptible to per-
ceptual illusions than healthy individuals. 
For instance, the McGurk phenomenon by 
which incongruence between certain lip 
movements and speech sounds produces 
the perception of alternative speech sounds 
appears to be exhibited to a lesser degree 
in individuals with schizophrenia (Pearl 
et al., 2009). Moreover, these individuals 
are more proficient at identifying a “hollow” 
face produced by inverting the binocular 
depth information of a facial image, than 
control subjects who illusorily perceive it in 
its naturally convex state (Schneider et al., 
1996, 2002). Dynamic causal modeling of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) data demonstrates that individuals 
with schizophrenia exhibit a weakening of 
top-down processes and a strengthening of 
bottom-up processes during presentation of 
“hollow” faces, whereas healthy individuals 
exhibit a strengthening of top-down pro-
cesses when encountering the same stimuli 
(Dima et al., 2009). This finding supports 
the notion of bi-directional propagation of 
predictions as discussed by Clark; and recent 
data support the role of increased top-down 
control with improved levels of symptoms 
(Krabbendam et al., 2009). However, there 
is also data supporting strengthened top-
down processes in schizophrenia using the 
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Computational modeling has proven 
valuable in the characterization of behav-
ioral and neurophysiological parameters 
relating to the updating of Bayesian pro-
cesses during information processing in 
schizophrenia (for example, Averbeck 
et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012). Temporal 
difference algorithms in particular offer 
an exploitable framework for improv-
ing our understanding of the declining 
influence of old information and integra-
tion of new experiences during decision 
making; their application to perceptual 
decisions made during illusion-evoking 
conditions potentially offers an excit-
ing window on the pathophysiology of 
schizophrenia.
The study of wide-ranging illusions pre-
sents a potentially fertile means of under-
standing the intricacies of predictive failures 
in schizophrenia as each illusion draws on 
specific perceptual and cognitive priors. On 
the flip side, the study of illusion potentially 
provides a tantalizing model for the study 
of distorted reality in the healthy brain. 
Furthermore, given the efficacy of dopa-
minergic pharmacological neuromodula-
tion in patients with schizophrenia, there 
is an urgent need for examination of the role 
of neurotransmitters in mediating predic-
tive coding.
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